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Abstract
In this paper we argue that Niccolò Machiavelli has little to do with Realism in International 
Relations theory.  By concentrating, as Machaivelli did, on the walls that define political 
relations—both inside and outside the polity—we find his insights deeply rooted in the specific 
political contexts of Sixteenth century Italy.  Others may wish to generalize from them, but 
Machiavelli did not.  In fact, as we show, Machiavelli was mindful of the difficulties of 
generalizing about walls and acknowledged the dangers political actors faced in navigating 
between the internal and external walls of the polity.  We examine the geopolitical contours of 
Machiavelli’s walls and seek to demonstrate how morality is present in these historical spaces. In 
contrast to Realists, Machiavelli was ready and willing to make ethical judgments. We argue that 
theorists of international politics should exercise care in reaching for Machiavelli as the iconic 
thinker for making sense of anarchy in world politics. This article concludes by suggesting that 
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No complex thinker fits his adjective
Wight (2005)
The tension between ‘realists’ and ‘utopians’ is one of the dominant legacies of early 
Twentieth Century theories of international politics. Taking human nature as it really is and 
extrapolating the institutional significance of this presumed account of human nature for the 
collective ordering of humanity is one of the primary ways in which political realism 
invokes Reality with a capital ‘R’ to interpret world politics. Realist thinking on the nature 
of the discipline is distilled from traditions of grand scholarship that reach beyond time, 
space and place in order to reveal the reality of political actors and political systems, a 
reality that the actors themselves may not themselves perceive. These traditions claim to 
proffer to the world eternal and immutable truths of international politics. Invoked 
selectively, they lend credibility to the narrative of political realism in which the state is the 
decisive political actor against the backdrop of systemic anarchy and its chronic insecurity. 
Despite the relative infancy of international relations theory it has sought to understand the 
past, present and future through a myriad of theoretical, historical and methodological 
formations: from the ancients to the moderns, from the scientific to the humanistic, from the 
religious to the institutional. 
Collecting theories is part of the disciplinary landscape of international relations. As 
Leszek Kolakowski (1990) remarked, ‘those who hate gardening need a theory’ by which he 
meant that a theory adds depth and profundity even if it adds nothing more. While our 
subject is not gardening, we note that there is a gardening book that uses Niccolò 
Machiavelli’s name (Crick, 2011), one example of how widely and freely his name is used. 
We do, nonetheless, hope to evoke a similar concern expressed by Kolakowski about the 
ideological status of theories for making sense (or lending credibility) to particular accounts 
of world politics. Should one have the audacity to consult SparkNotes (Editors, 2002), so 
often consulted by students, there one finds that Machiavelli ‘advised rulers to use deceit 
and violence as tools against other states.’ Implicit in such claims is an assumption that 
Machiavelli has offered the discipline of International Relations just such a sensational (and 
accurate) account of human nature that his presence in the canon of international relations 
theory would serve as a constant reminder why anarchy is the essential and defining feature 
of realist accounts of international politics. That said, we hope to demonstrate a deeper 
complexity to Machiavelli’s thinking than merely a footnote to political realism for he was 
an astute observer of strategic political action and knew well its tragic consequences.
Walls, friends, and enemies
A preoccupation with the ontological status of anarchy (Bull 1977) — its origins, 
workings and increasingly its limits — is one of the primary starting points for students of 
international politics: Anarchy is what states make of it. Anarchy is the enduring reality of 
the international system. Anarchy turns us into beasts. Anarchy compels states (and 
sometimes their citizens) to seek out the conditions of security. We stress the role of anarchy 
for the discipline as a whole, to emphasize the fact that the modern state (as the primary 
vehicle and expression of modern political rationality) is a historically contingent form that 
Machiavelli neither anticipated, perceived, nor understood. Ergo, we highlight the risks in 
embracing Machiavelli as a grand philosopher for both political realism and the broader 
field of world politics. 
In this paper we examine how scholarship, which takes anarchy as the ontological 
condition of realist international politics, has selectively mobilized Machiavelli for the sake 
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of interest defined in terms of power’ (Morgenthau, 1948, 4-15 and Morgenthau 1947, 175-
176; cf. Wendt 1992, 391). In assessing the dominant status of anarchy for international 
politics we note that international theory has progressively moved from conceptions of 
human nature to the interactions between ‘structure and process’ in making sense of 
international politics. A crucial aspect of the debate between ‘realists’ and ‘utopians’ turns 
on questions about the order of international discourse and how states feature as the primary 
unit of analysis in thinking about the layering of international politics. In taking states as the 
primary unit of analysis there is a tendency to engage in what Ken Booth referred to as 
‘heritage’ international relations. As Booth (1995, 108) argues, the academic privileging of 
realism has meant that “[t]he subject has been dominated by fatalists about human nature or 
political structures whose ‘explanations’ add to our sorrows by their verdicts that our 
destinies are inescapable.’ Machiavelli is routinely identified as a forerunner of political 
realism. As Patrick Stewart (2014) put it in the National Interest ‘[f]ive centuries later his 
primer [The Prince] on statecraft remains required if unsettling reading for practitioners and 
students of politics.’
In Chapter XV of The Prince, Machiavelli considered the place of virtue in statecraft. 
Things that ostensibly appear virtuous may, despite good intentions, be ruinous to a prince. 
Similarly, things ‘that are seemingly bad, which, if followed by a prince, procure his peace 
and security.’ Good may come from evil as evil may come from good, an observation made 
by Max Weber in ‘Politics as a Vocation’ (1946 [1919], 122) that sums up a dimension of 
Machiavelli’s thinking about the interaction of politics and ethics. Weber, like Machiavelli, 
calls for finer judgments of the dynamic between ethics and politics rather than a simple 
antithesis. In contrast, reductionist accounts of Machiavelli’s work strictly separate politics 
and morality.  
Walls, external and internal, offer a key to much of Machiavelli’s intention.  In 
understanding how and why walls emerge, and the purposes they serve will enhance 
Machiavelli’s contribution to world politics. 
In what follows we dwell on Machiavelli’s world and on his own words, rather than 
accept the routine categorization of Machiavelli as a realist in the terms conventionally 
associated with international relations theory (e.g., Waltz, 1959; Evans, 1972; Gilpin, 1981; 
Brown, 1992; Booth, 1996; Doyle, 1997; Crawford, 2000; Mearsheimer, 2001; and many 
more). Seconding the efforts of others like Steven Forde (1992 and 1995), we hope to 
temper the glib generalizations often drawn from his remarks. Machiavelli was a close 
observer of a political world dominated by personalities and personal rule. The threats of 
campaigning armies made him think hard about what could be done by a small, independent 
city to secure itself. Machiavelli did not generalize to other times and places (in fact, it is his 
realist acolytes who have subsequently universalized his work), but rather he concentrated 
on the dire needs of his time and place. We approach Machiavelli as a high-context writer 
(Hall, 1976), that is, he rooted his thoughts in the context of his experience and did not seek 
to generalize beyond that, but rather to bring such generalizations as there were to bear on 
the context. He did not have the appetite for philosophical speculation that, say, underlies 
the political theories of Thomas Hobbes or Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  This lack of appetite is 
apparent from his works, and it is worth remembering that neither The Prince nor The 
Discourses were written for publication.  Machiavelli did not possess the foresight to look 
over the horizon to imagine developments like the modern state. Nor did he lay down 
principles to found a school of political thought now commonly referred to as political 
realism. He did not aspire to reveal abstract and universal claims about ‘power’ and ‘the 
political’; rather his aim was to find the tools to cope with the world in which he lived and, 
above all else, to provide context to the political.  
In Machiavelli’s time and place politics was about the life and death of the leader and 
the primacy of maintaining one’s regime in the face of adversity. If the prince was displaced 
4by an internal rival or an external enemy, then more than likely the everyone suffered. 
Michel Foucault (1990, 88-89 and 94; see Schaap 2000) declared the need figuratively to cut 
off the king’s head to make sovereignty impersonal, but the politics in Machiavelli’s time 
meant that regime change more often than not meant literal death for many innocent 
bystanders. For a contemporary illustrations of this kind of politics we have only to watch 
the evening news from so-called failed regimes around the world, Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Mexico, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, or Zaire. These are windows on Machiavelli’s 
world where everything is at stake and nothing is secure. In contrast to such fragile worlds, 
most readers of this journal live in settled and ordered societies in which procedures take 
priority over the very terms of political discourse, all very far removed the frangible world 
of Machiavelli. Our durable political worlds are notable for their incrementalism and 
moderation. Regime change at elections, policy changes after elections, neither is followed 
by political murder. Our politics is the routine mark zoning disputes, concern about illegal 
immigration, funding formulas for higher education, legality of LGBTQ marriage, 
compulsory bottle return fees, preservation of bird sanctuaries, privacy of internet 
metadata…the list goes on and on. Though many of the protagonists in these matters will 
declare that the issues are life and death, they pale in contrast to living and dying in failed 
regimes.  To return to Machiavelli own failed regime, when Girolamo Savonarola, together 
with two acolytes, was hanged and burned, a spectacle that Machiavelli probably witnessed 
just a few days before he began work at the Chancellery, he saw political life exposed to its 
core. In Savonarola’s world there were no erudite seminars on semantics of virtù, fortuna, 
and free will. In Machiavelli’s Florence threats were literal not figurative, factual not 
metaphorical, immediate not distant, today and not tomorrow, certain not possible, visible 
not abstract. In Machiavelli’s world the blood was on the floor, on the walls, and definitely 
on one’s hands. Dirty hands (Walzer, 1973) or  ‘blood on the floor’ was not the trivial figure 
of speech that it has become for lazy journalists today (e.g., Thomas 2015). There was 
nothing metaphorical about reference to for Machiavelli, who knew of Cesare Borgia’s 
spectacular murder of his own lieutenant Ramiro Lorqua. Indeed, Machiavelli arrived on the 
scene himself within hours of the deed and saw the corpse (Ridolfi, 1963, 62: cf. The Prince 
Chapter VII).  
The External Walls
‘Good fences make good neighbors,’ the poet Robert Frost wrote twice in ‘Mending 
Wall’ (1914, 11-12), though he admitted that ‘something there is that doesn’t love a wall’ 
and even that ‘we do not need a wall’ but the two neighbors in the poem do build the dry 
stone wall that divides a field between them. Politics has its walls: The Berlin Wall, 
Hadrian’s Wall, the West Bank Barrier in Israel, the Maginot Line, the Secure Fence along 
the Mexican border in Arizona, the Great Wall of China, the Demilitarized Zone in Korea, in 
Kashmir, and on the Green Line in Cyprus — these are walls between nation states. None of 
these walls are the product of the cooperation of friendly neighbors as Frost portrayed.  
Walls come in different shapes and sizes and serve different purposes, from the mundane to 
the geopolitical.  Walls can make good neighbors in two ways.  First external walls can 
reduce conflict among neighbors as some of the examples above show and they can channel 
interaction through portals.  Second internal walls within a polity can promote harmony in 
part by keeping people away from each other. While our focus is on the former, external 
walls, the two kinds of walls do connect and we will comment on this, too, in a minor key.  
In 1526, after writing the manuscripts of The Prince and The Discourses, he was 
recalled from enforced retirement and assigned duty as the secretary of the Procuratori delle 
Mura (literally, Officials of the Walls). It was a committee to evaluate the status of the 
external, defensive walls of Florence in case of attack and to recommend improvements. 
Machiavelli, then fifty-seven years old, but twelve months from his death, threw himself 
into the task and kept at it (Capponi, 2010, 275; Ridolfi., 1963, 227). The secretary was the 
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been on his mind. In The Prince he had mused on fortifications and fortresses in Chapter 
XX, concluding that walls were no substitute for motivated citizen army. In The Discourses 
(Book II, 17), he noted that ‘no walls, no matter how great’ can long keep foreign cannons at 
bay. In addition to these private reflections in these manuscripts unpublished in his lifetime, 
Machiavelli also addressed walls in the one book he had intended for publication, namely, 
The Art of War in Book III (92-3 and 95), where he concluded that skillful opponents always 
find a way to overcome fortifications, as the Romans found a way to deal with Hannibal’s 
moving wall of elephants. Yet he also knew from bitter personal experience that the walls of 
Pisa resisted Florentine attacks far too long, while the walls at Prato had been no match for 
Spanish cannons.  There was no generalization in those two contrasting experiences.  In the 
one case walls were effective, in the other they were not. Some walls crumble, whilst others 
stand the test for a time, at least.  The world of experience does not offer ready 
generalizations.  
Machiavelli is often cited as a writer who embodied the modern art of diplomacy (e.g., 
Berridge, 2001). One of Machiavelli’s primary diplomatic goals was a wall around Florence, 
one that kept out its enemies. To the already existing local rivals foreigners had recently 
been added to the political mix with an influx of French, Spanish, or German (and Swiss) 
armies onto the Florentine scene. The combinations of these threats were numerous and 
deadly, and ever changing as alliances came and went. If Florence had secure outside walls, 
then ordinary life could go inside those walls with conflict and competition limited (Walker, 
1993). It is necessary to resolve internal disputes without rupturing the external walls. 
Channeling, mediating and resolving internal conflicts so that they do not jeopardize the 
strength of external walls is a significant test for any political system as it lives out the 
problematique (Foucault, 2009 [1977-1978]) of its security politics. The walls of the city 
must withstand many pressures, internal as well as external: whether pikes, battering rams, 
cannons, scaling ladders, catapult shots, or the possibility of a long siege. As threats to the 
walls of the city have evolved, so too has technology in response to new types of assaults. 
Not only is such engineering specialized, it is also expensive. A twelve-foot thick wall might 
be just the thing to blunt cannon balls and catapult shots. A cantilevered wall might 
discourage the use of scaling ladders. Military engineering is not, however, necessary for 
internal walls. The difference between external and internal walls is readily to hand in nearly 
any dwelling.  The external walls are built to withstand the weather — rain, winds, burning 
sun, heavy snow, ice, hail, flying debris, and so on. 
Aristotle remarked in the first book of The Politics that politics is the community within 
which all other communities exist; it is the shell around all other communities and that is 
echoed with a special urgency by Machiavelli in The Discourses: ‘when the safety of one’s 
country is at stake’ nothing else matters but its salvation (Book I, Chapters III and XII). The 
security of walls (against both internal and external threats) means that when confronted 
with an emergency it may be necessary to suspend, violate, or disregard the normal 
operation of entrenched regime of laws, rights and freedoms. In states of emergency internal 
questions of justice are secondary to the external survival of political community. 
Earlier we asserted that Machiavelli was a high-context writer. Perhaps we can now 
explain that assertion if we liken him to a cricket commentator, focused entirely on the game 
at hand. Though the commentator may know a great deal about the game, its history, its 
possibilities, patterns in play, strategic alternatives, and more, the commentator confines the 
commentary to the play that is happening on the day itself. If fast bowlers are at work the 
commentator does not elaborate on leg spin bowling.  Though Wisden Cricketers’ Almanack 
enumerates more than three hundred field-placings, the commentator discusses only those 
pertinent to the day’s play, i.e., the context.  This kind of focus is what Machiavelli applied 
to the politics of his day.  That politics was not every kind of possibility to be found in a 
reference work like Wisden’s but only the personal rule and empires of his time and place. 
6To abstract and reify from one cricket broadcaster’s comments to a theory of cricket, well 
that would be a mistake. It is a mistake to be avoided in the case of Machiavelli, too.  
Machiavelli is a student of the political game as he saw it played in the here and now, not as 
it could or might be played on another day in other contexts. For this reason, extrapolating a 
comprehensive theory of international politics from Machiavelli’s writings distorts his 
insights. His paternity of political realism is not a simple matter of a DNA test, though even 
these can err. The entrenched (realist) dualism between ethics and politics clearly has 
methodological significance for the discipline of International Relations but this is not a 
division to be found in Machiavelli’s works. The moral question for Machiavelli is 
significantly more complex than that suggested by renderings in political science textbooks. 
E. H. Carr in his enduring The Twenty Year’s Crisis (1964 [1939], 63-65) identified 
Machiavelli as one of the first political realists and the label stuck. Carr found three 
fundamental ‘tenets’ in Machiavelli’s ‘doctrine’ that provide a basis to understand the 
primary features of realist philosophy: (a) Machiavelli’s account of history implicitly rejects 
utopian accounts of order, establishing the priority of historical cause and effect over 
normative accounts of political order; (b) Machiavelli derived theory from practice, rather 
than deriving practice from theory; and (c) Machiavelli established the ascendance of the 
political over morality, recognizing (along with Hobbes) that morality always derives from 
politics. As Carr argued there, ‘Machiavelli recognized the importance of morality, but 
thought that there could be no effective morality where there was no effective authority.’ 
Taken together, Carr’s endorsement of Machiavelli as the progenitor of modern realism 
advanced a scientific account of both national and international history, and implicitly 
rejected utopianism in considering the role of theory in world politics, and offered a 
segmented understanding of international politics in which morality and ethics are always 
counterpoised to politics. 
Whilst Carr acknowledged the legacy of Enlightenment thinking in shaping traditions of 
political realism (especially the belief in human progress) there is still an implicit 
understanding that the enduring ethic of the international system is inherently anti-
progressivist; in short, anarchy cannot be overcome. This constitutive ethic of international 
politics operates in such a way that establishing a common basis both of and for agreement 
between states, territories and peoples is impossible. Carr phrased this constitutive ethic in 
terms of the realist critique of liberal interwar internationalism. The notion that there can be 
a harmony of interests amongst different political actors at the global level is not readily 
accepted amongst realists. Deploying universalist or humanitarian doctrines for the sake of 
‘truth’ or ‘justice’ is problematic within this realist ontology. Distaste for the notion of de-
contextualized universal truths is thereby taken to be a grounding ethic of international 
relations. What follows from this assumption is an account of international politics in which 
antagonistic states actively jockey for power in the absence of a ‘common interest in peace.’  
For Carr, reading the international system in terms of the conditions of cause and effect 
within world history has meant that international history depends on the constellations of 
friends and enemies within the world system. This is an unstated assumption of Carr’s 
reading of interest in international politics, which along with the likes of Carl Schmitt 
(1996[1938]), warns against universalizing the particular within international politics. For 
assuming a commonality of interests — shared across time, space and historical location — 
entails a neglect of the political economy of enmity within international politics. As Schmitt 
suggests, the most we can hope for is ‘mere coexistence’ in world politics since the spatial 
practices of states disallow political commonalities and moral universals. As Carr observed, 
‘supposedly absolute and universal principles’ are in fact reflections of the particular desires 
of individual states within the world system. In rejecting maximal accounts of international 
law, Carr concluded ‘as soon as the attempt is made to apply these supposedly abstract 
principles to a concrete political situation, they are revealed as the transparent disguises of 
selfish vested interests.’  
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in order to understand politics among nation-states. For realists working from the positivist 
tradition, this bedrock has long established the state as the decisive international actor in 
which sovereignty is assessed through the relative distribution and exercise of power within 
the international system. The analogy of the billiard balls, the classic statement of power 
maximization within the realist tradition, involves the state ‘acting with a single mind and 
single will’ (Wolfers, 1951, 40). Machiavelli is often invoked to justify this account of 
international order, with the claim that he would always emphasize the divisions between 
states (often taken as a substitute for principalities) as the primary basis for assessing the 
international system. What is overlooked in this rendering of Machiavelli — as the 
foundational realist thinker — is the importance of reading Machiavelli in his own context 
to see both his complexity and his irony. That is to say, assuming that the absence of a 
common moral order, following Carr, results in the absence of communal bonds within the 
world system is to flatten the account of the world system to little more than a game of tin 
soldiers. What is universal in this account of world politics, continues Wolfers, is the 
‘egoistical pursuit of power’ in which states compete for power as part of a ‘continuous and 
inescapable struggle for survival.’ Nonetheless, to presume that the conditions of world 
politics in the middle of the Twentieth Century map onto early Renaissance Italy is 
problematic for realist thinking. Not only does this overlay presume issue-orthodoxy (that is, 
the problem of anarchy will always be the problem, irrespective of time, place and 
geopolitical location) but, more importantly, it establishes a relational ethic of state conduct 
in which those outside the walls, the Other, must always be enemies: ‘there can be no amity 
between them, unless it is be an alignment against a common foe’ (Wolfers, 1951). 
John Agnew (1994, 65) has warned against equating the city-state of Machiavelli’s 
context with the contemporary state system which international relations theory has 
established as the guiding norm for understanding world politics: ‘The European medieval 
world was one of local and hierarchical rather than territorial allegiances.’ In adopting a 
critical outlook to the territorial basis of political community, Agnew warns students of 
world politics to avoid collapsing time and space into a single moment in which the state is 
the manifestation of international rationality. Further Agnew (1994, 69) noted that it was 
only in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries that the imperative of state survival 
(defending, maintaining, and extending the state) became the dominant norm of international 
politics. This imperative of state survival carried with it a concomitant assumption that the 
borders of the state would be synonymous with the domestic contours of society, concluded 
Agnew (1994, 69): ‘Only inside the state territory is there social order; outside is anarchy 
and danger.’ Borders, these are the outside walls of the polity. 
We say ‘polity’ and not ‘state’ because we have concluded, along with Agnew above, 
that states, as we know them today, did not exist in Machiavelli’s world. France was well on 
the way to becoming a state and Spain was not far behind but neither had arrived during 
Machiavelli’s lifetime at that development. Whilst we have no desire to argue about the 
definition of a ‘state’ we assume that a state in contemporary meaning, includes ongoing 
institutions and entrenched practices with a defined territory that outlive any incumbent 
(Mansfield, 1983). In contrast to these stable political regimes, we have the fragile worlds of 
leadership and leaders in Machiavelli’s time. These leaders included the Emperor of the 
Holy Roman Empire, the Popes, that unarmed prophet Savonarola, Medicis many, the one 
and only Catharina Sforza, Italian warlords and princelings by the score, and most of all the 
extraordinary Cesare Borgia and his famous sister Lucrezia: none of whom can be described 
as states, state actors, or any of their equivalent. Their actions, achievements, rule were 
personal, not institutional. On any coherent definition the state, Machiavelli had no inkling 
of it. For Machiavelli politics sprang from the mind and energy of the leader (in the tradition 
of Plutarch), not the inertia of settled practices we associate with the state today.
8Of course, with hindsight we know something Machiavelli did not know, the state was 
emerging at that time with an enduring command of territory, a continuity that transcended 
personalities, and a capacity to apply resources concentrated on scales not theretofore seen 
in human history. This hindsight does not mean Machiavelli, however insightful he was, 
anticipated the nation-state. Rather Machiavelli was run over by history, that is, the cities of 
Italy were run over by the nascent nation-states of France and Spain. The independent cities 
that today remain like Monaco, San Marino, Singapore, and the Vatican remind us just how 
small a city-state was. 
Establishing the contingency—whether temporal, spatial, or historical—of the 
contemporary state makes it hard to reach back to the city-states of Renaissance times for a 
theory of international politics suitable for the dangers and risks of the contemporary world. 
Yet many early scholars of international relations theory have drawn upon Machiavelli as a 
means of expressing the geopolitical quagmire and security dilemmas of the Cold War. 
The Internal Walls
Machiavelli’s references to life within the walls are few. Like many intellectuals 
observing the workings of international political community, there is an assumption of a 
homogenous domesticity that is threatened by the world beyond the walls. This 
inside/outside conception of walled order has implications for the conduct of the prince 
within the city. Of course, every threat can be exaggerated and lies can be told. An 
unscrupulous prince can claim everything is crucial to the security of the outside walls. Yet 
a prince who cries ‘Security!’ too often loses credibility and support from within the city 
walls. However, it is salutary to remember that sometimes the external threat is lethal. 
When the exterior walls are secure, politics is of no interest to citizens safely inside the 
those ramparts.  Machiavelli supposed, having written that only a few citizens in any city 
will engage in politics, whatever the form of government. In The Discourses in Book I, 
Chapter 16 he estimated the number of politicians at forty or fifty. We propose to take him 
at his words, the more so since he had observed politics very closely as one among the 
politicians in Florence with its elaborate republican institutions (Najmey, 2006). Despite the 
participatory fora, despite the mandatory service, despite the elections to office, Machiavelli 
saw how hollow were the forms of participation in Florentine politics. We cannot fully 
describe the intricacies of Florentine politics in his time but in stable times the guild 
members (merchants and artisans) who qualified to participate in the republican institutions 
had no interest in doing so but preferred to maximize their businesses to make a profit by 
avoiding civic duties—like all those members of academic departments who seldom attend 
university meetings and even when physically present their hearts and minds are largely 
absent. Though entitled to participate, Florentine citizens overwhelmingly had other 
priorities.  In Florence to cater for the other priorities of citizens the tenure of office was two 
months. The composition of the ruling council would change five times in a year, making 
the most vacillating contemporary democratic government seem stable. In peacetime most 
of the councilors would rather not be there, and in bad times there was nothing they could do 
but to pass blame back and forth, as most of us would do today.
While life within the walls must surrender primacy to the external walls in times of 
crisis, but ultimately the purpose of those walls is to make normal life possible within the 
house. Where secure walls exist established practices grow and in time these may pass into 
institutions creating one of the conditions that sustain the rule of law. Though we presume 
that Machiavelli had no such concept as ‘rule of law,’ despite the remarkable efforts of one 
writer to attribute it to him (Bobbitt, 2013), we use the term ‘rule of law’ merely to suggest 
order, reliability, and predictability in resolving disagreements within the boundaries of 
political community (Raeff, 1983) and nothing more technical or elaborate. Nevertheless 
there are rules, practices, conventions governing civil society and we liken these to the 
interior walls of a building.  These interior walls) as a zone of relative homogeneity) are less 
9substantial than the external walls (as a zone of radical different). To some Realist the 
domain of ethics is within the walls, and that of politics is outside the walls.  In Carr’s 
words, it would be utopian to suppose that ethics has purchase outside the external walls. 
We see no such perfect divide in Machiavelli who finds the success of Agathocles 
dishonorable (The Prince, Chapter VIII) and as we presently shall see seeks a prince who 
must learn how not to be good.  
Those living in a well-ordered society forget how difficult it is to create and sustain the 
conditions for order. The laboratories of failed regimes are a powerful reminder that the 
contours of political community, especially its walls, are essential for governing.
Machiavelli, Realism, and Human Nature 
Theorists of realism in the discipline of International Relations often attribute a timeless 
quality to human nature and subsequently use this as a basis to make ontological claims 
about the structures of order and disorder in world politics. The tendency to invoke 
Machiavelli as an early theorist of human nature illustrates how dramatically the context has 
been taken out of the Machiavellian equation. To imagine that contemporary men have 
changed from those of ancient Rome wrote Machiavelli in The Discourses (Book III, 
Chapter 43) is to suppose that ‘heaven, the sun…the elements… have changed their 
motions.’ The reality of our human nature is a response to the types of threats faced by 
citizens as they negotiate the walls of political discourse, both internal and external. The 
brutality within human nature only emerges in rebellion against the internal walls or, more 
spectacularly, when threatened by outside forces that jeopardize the external walls. 
International Relations theories have focused on the outside walls, just as Machiavelli did. In 
a similar vein, conflict, violence and war have always taken precedence over the consensus, 
peace and virtue. In the annals of world politics, long-term harmony escapes rigorous 
dissection and analysis, either in the mass media or on the shelves of international political 
theory. The safe and sane is too boring for headlines. Titus Livy skipped generations of 
Roman order and calm to concentrate on the exciting part, like a scriptwriter today, who 
concentrates on the conflict and not the cooperation in a narrative. 
Perhaps it is because of this preoccupation with conflict that theorists like Carr and 
Kenneth Waltz (1979, 79) are sure that Machiavelli stands as the key thinker for 
understanding the balance of power in world politics. For Waltz, Machiavelli’s contribution 
to political realism is his awareness of the changing configurations of power. It is important 
to note that this specifically links to the question of order outside the city walls: namely, 
‘Machiavelli stands so clearly as the exponent of Realpolitik that one easily slips into 
thinking that he developed the closely associated idea of balance of power as well.’ Though 
Waltz qualified this statement by noting that conceptions of balance of power are a more 
recent invention, specifically as they relate to the challenges states face as they negotiate 
both their internal and external walls.
In The Nature and Destiny of Man, Reinhold Niebuhr (1964 [1943], 277) argued that 
the Renaissance ‘recognized the perils of conflict in the dynamic elements of social 
existence; but it was prompted by these insights to elaborate absolutistic theories of the 
state.’ Niebuhr also identifies Machiavelli as a key thinker for establishing ‘the doctrine of 
the moral autonomy for the state.’ It is this ethic which leads to ‘[t]he pride of nations and 
the arrogance of self-deification of collective man’ vis-à-vis Christianity and the church 
(218). In Moral Man and Immoral Society (2005 [1932], 62), Niebuhr averred that ‘[t]he 
man in the street, with his lust for power and prestige thwarted by his own limitations and 
the necessities of social life, projects his ego upon his nation and indulges his anarchic lusts 
vicariously.’ In tracing genealogies of morality in political thought Alasdair MacIntyre 
(2007 [1981], 10) has also identified Machiavelli as a figure in political thought for whom 
there exists no established way of dealing with rival premises or truth claims apart from 
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conflict itself. It is Machiavelli’s provision of an immutable account of human nature that 
has lit the eternal flame of desire for realist scholars of international politics. 
Invoking ‘humanity’ or ‘universals’ as standards for assessing conduct within 
international politics is typically regarded as a futile venture for the hardened political 
realist. If we are to make sense of the conduct of states, especially as relational discourses 
that are shaped through the imagined communities of the nation, then we need to examine 
the cultural, spatial and geopolitical order of knowledge within international politics. For 
realist thinkers, this can only be achieved if we examine the constitution of world politics in 
terms of a system of amity/enmity. External threats come and go, and sometimes like the 
moon they can the tide off internal threats too. When a French army approached Florence in 
1498, some Florentines hoped to make a separate and better peace with the French at the 
expense of their fellows. The clink of French gold might have found willing hands in 
Florence no matter how well governed it was. This speaks to the opportunistic flaws that 
exist within perceptions of our human nature, revealing the limits of political community 
when friends become enemies. 
Beyond the outer walls of Machiavelli’s Italy there were the superpowers of France and 
Spain, along with the impressive, if ramshackle, Holy Roman Empire in Germania. Florence 
also faced regional rivals, with powers like Venice and Milan to be reckoned with. Finally 
there was the supranational Latin-speaking power of the Papacy. These powers might 
cooperate, compete, or conflict in changing combinations and shifting alliances, sometimes 
public and explicit, whilst at other times de facto or secret. Cesare Borgia tried to forge his 
own kingdom in the Romagna. Such geopolitical constellations suggest the importance of 
place and, more importantly, scale for making sense of the political realities of Machiavelli’s 
world. 
Vigilance and prudence were important qualities for navigating the geopolitical world(s) 
inhabited by Machiavelli. We have noted that politics was a reluctant business for most 
Florentines, it is important to note that not everyone wanted to be prince. In fact, in a given 
time and place perhaps there was no one plotting against the prince, though several would be 
ready to take over if a vacancy occurred. If few aspired to be prince, many might invariably 
conspire for a change. Being a prince-maker brings its own rewards. 
Who can tell by looking what a person is thinking? Who can be sure by looking what a 
person will do? Even those we know well can surprise us. There is no obvious way to be 
sure and so precautions are in order. Some of the internal walls will be designed to protect 
the prince from rivals and their supporters, just as in some houses there are privacy locks on 
some internal doors. Today it is the rare prime minister or president of even the most stable 
nation who appears in public without a platoon of bodyguards just as a Renaissance prince 
did. As one fictional Cold War secret agent advised a protégé: ‘Let a man show friendship 
for you and you've got to deny him, mistrust him, suspect him, and nine times out of ten 
you'll be wrong but it's the tenth time that'll save you from a dirty death…’ (Hall, 1971, 16). 
Although, as we will suggest below, Machiavelli’s advice is less brutal than this.  
As to outside enemies, to build and protect the walls the prince may have to do some 
terrible things. Like a soldier in battle he may have to do things no one should ever do in 
domestic life within secure walls. This dual profile of morality, establishing a moral gulf 
between public and private worlds, has operated as a significant narrative of international 
relations theory since the early Twentieth Century. Michael Walzer explored this moral 
territory in ‘Political Action’ (1973, 175) where he noted that Machiavelli limited the prince 
to what is necessary to maintain stability. Walzer’s survey of the legalist paradigm also 
restricts forceful conduct at the international level, as territorial integrity and political 
sovereignty are the cornerstones of customary law at the international level. When all is said 
and done, there remains the inviolability of the external walls. This has been a dominant 
theme of international relations research and whilst many scholars after the end of Cold War 
re-phrased sovereignty as a protective discourse (e.g., the Responsibility to Protect) we 
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should note that the focus is still on the protective apparatus of the state against external 
threats. Those who comment on Machiavelli often assume that the selfish interest of the 
prince alone is at stake, but on the contrary we contend that Machiavelli’s purpose is much 
broader, namely a stable and orderly society which a strong prince can make possible by 
building those redoubts.  For Machiavelli, the prince is a soldier in battle at times but not at 
all times. The prince must learn to judge those times and govern himself accordingly. If the 
prince acts as though it was war all the time, then he will exhaust himself, his wealth, his 
supporters, and antagonize the populace. 
In addition to balancing moral questions with the exigencies of political life, the prince 
must also make determinations about when a normal regime of law can or should be 
suspended.  There is no certain formula for determining when the rule of law or settled 
regimes of politics should be suspended but there are many examples such as these: In 1970 
the Liberal Canadian Prime Minister invoked the War Measures Act to put armed troops on 
the streets of Montréal; in 1984 the Socialist president of France declared a state of siege 
existed in New Caledonia to suspend civil liberties and impose martial law and in 2011 the 
Conservative New Zealand government declared a national state of emergency after the 
Christchurch earthquake. By suspending the rule of law in such cases (as Cicero is alleged to 
have done through the senatus consultum ultimum) it is evident that states possess the 
capacity to act beyond and outside the restraints of their own legal procedures. The point of 
these examples is that such extraordinary powers do exist and that these are sometimes used 
to save the walls within which we live. 
To be explicit, to build the outside walls a prince may have to overcome opposition, 
resistance, and dissent from within the community itself. When times are calm, then no one 
wants to pay for great walls, no one wants to have their labor conscripted to build them. The 
taxes will have to be levied, nonetheless, and the labor obtained. Others will not want the 
walls to be just there but further over to accommodate their land or house. Others will want 
the contracts to build the walls and reap the profits. This is one way in which outside/inside 
politics meet. Increasingly, we are witnessing a blurring of the distinction between 
outside/inside walls. 
To deal with opponents, internal or external, real or imagined, the prince may have to 
make common cause with enemies, including some pretty disagreeable characters and 
downright villains. As expressed by that old adage: my enemy’s enemy is my friend. These 
alliances may be temporary; they may be specific; they are unlikely to endure. Necessity is 
difficult to judge and there will be arguments about those judgments too. Yet necessity has a 
way of silencing any critics, ushering unto the stage of world politics an acceptance that 
political discourse at the international level is nasty, brutish and inherently perilous.
Frenemies?
Noting that Machiavelli became an important figurehead in Italian fascism, Schmitt 
(1996 [1938], 84) also documented how scholars created a political myth called 
Machiavellism and, in so doing, overlooked his humanism. At about the same time Antonio 
Gramsci advised the Italian communism to make itself into ‘The Modern Prince’ (1957 
[1926]).  Schmitt continued, ‘[s]ome sober sentences and disconnected phrases of the poor 
Florentine humanist served to give the world the moralistic horror picture: 
“Machiavellism”.’ So readily is Machiavelli’s name dropped that William Stark, the 
translator of Friedrich Meinecke’s (1957 [1924], ix) study of raison d’etat, added the word 
‘Machiavellianism’ to the title (Bew, 2015).  
Machiavelli did say that a prince would have to learn how not to be good. That is, he 
would have to learn to do the despicable things necessary.  ‘Learn’ is the word.  It does not 
come naturally nor easily, and some princes are incapable of learning to do these things and 
they come to ruin, and along with them their peoples (Prince, 1513, Chapter. XVIII). ‘Ruin’ 
is the right word here.  Machiavelli was not talking about an election where one team 
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replaces another and new innovations result in the logos on subway trains being changed 
and the livery repainted. We rather think Machiavelli would find the stakes in most 
contemporary elections amusing. For all the fulminating by rival candidates and the 
exaggeration piled on by the media, there is little at stake in the way of blood and bone.  
Machiavelli’s prince, might best be a decent person who must learn how and when not 
be good, that would be there best ruler. But ‘very rarely will be there be found a good man 
ready to use bad methods’ (The Discourses, Book I, Chapter 18).  Even so the walls have to 
be built by someone. And over time, even a short time, a good man may become corrupted 
and leave the taps of cruelty and savagery on for too long. Despite the many who say 
Machiavelli recommended cruelty for its own sake and counseled the selfish lust for power, 
he did not do either but he knew they happened, worse, he knew that sometimes they were 
necessary. The prince may not be moderate in his personality but that matters less if the 
prince is a good judge of when and how it is necessary to be evil to defend the city walls, 
then good may come of it.  Defense of the outside walls may have a cost on the inside walls, 
but as long as the proportion is right, that has to be endured. That proportion is another 
matter of judgment. Surely Machiavelli would have agreed with Horace Walpole who said 
‘that no great country was ever saved by good men’ because good men will not go the 
lengths that may be necessary’ (Walpole 1840 [1790], 426). 
One can see in Machiavelli a single text from The Prince to The Discourses working 
from the outside walls to the inside walls, wherein once the outside walls are built and prove 
durable, the prince is finished and republican government must follow to make the most of 
the stability afforded to inside walls (Winarski 1963 and Mansfield 1996).  Of course, the 
move from foundation of the walls to perpetuation of a republican regime such as 
Machiavelli extolls on page after page of The Discourses is not an easy matter. Possibly 
Machiavelli realized that and so did not discuss it in those pages, though he did discuss it 
later in a report commissioned by the Medici in 1520, the ‘Discourse on the affairs after the 
death of Lorenzo d’Medici the Younger’ in which he urged the Medici family to retain the 
republican institutions of Florence in the interest of stability. By blending the rule of the 
leading family with these institutions – internal walls – some moderation and continuity 
might result.  This consultant’s report was not well received. 
Conclusion: Machiavelli beyond Realism and Utopianism
Scholars have ‘collected’ Machiavelli as part of the desire to establish a genealogy for 
realist theory in international politics. The attraction of this approach to Machiavelli is its 
timelessness, its universality, it contextlessness. This genealogy is achieved by ignoring the 
temporal and spatial dimensions of Machiavelli’s world. We should be careful about 
reducing Machiavelli to the ultimate theme park of Realpolitik, as this deletes the complex 
development of the modern state that came after Machiavelli had completed his works.  
Charles Tilly (1985, 171) observed how politics has worked through discourses of 
political violence and the central role that war-making plays in defining the walls of the 
modern state. Four processes are inherent in the formation of the modern nation-state: war 
making, state making, protection and extraction. Referring to both Machiavelli and Hobbes, 
Tilly argued that ‘political observers have recognized that, whatever else they do, 
governments organize and wherever possible, monopolize violence.’ In many ways, 
Machiavelli can be regarded as an example of the transfer of ideas into the field of 
international politics. Whether we consider the intellectual legacy behind the Project for the 
New American Century or the predominantly male corridors of Chatham House, we 
encounter a merchandising system in which political ideas are manufactured and ultimately 
consumed in order to legitimate a particular type of international system. Ken Booth (1995, 
104) wrote that ‘academic international relations too often performs the function of the 
Prozac of the human sciences.’ That is, it numbs one into acceptance rather than into seeking 
out alternatives to the structural contradictions which lye beneath international order. Whilst 
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early Twentieth Century realists did not purport to offer a solution to the problem of 
anarchy, the theoretical paradigm that they developed is replete with claims about the 
possibility of differentiating between the world as it is and the world as it should, taking the 
former as fixed. Realist thinkers have continually stressed how a methodological 
commitment to positivism delivers a deeper and more accurate insight into the ontology of 
international politics. This is expressed in Morgenthau’s (1978 [1948] 13) totemic fifth 
principle of Realism that ‘[p]olitical realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a 
particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.’ In examining Machiavelli’s 
contribution to Realist thinking, we would demand greater attention to the paradoxes and 
complexities of his political thought in the context of his life and times in the context of 
early Renaissance Italy.
Machiavelli’s complexity is hidden by his simple and direct prose. The mistake is to 
think he offered conclusions for all times and places. He had no interest in first principles. 
He did not laying down the foundation of Realism, rather he addressed immediate problems 
in the walls, not giving lessons in design, architecture, or masonry. He did not look into the 
future when he wrote; he did look left and right and all around. He was, after all, not a 
philosopher and did not want to be one. Professional philosophers in the academy know this 
for he is seldom to be found on the curriculum in a Department of Philosophy. Machiavelli 
did not read Plato and Aristotle; had they been on the shelf it is doubtful he would have 
turned to them. 
Machiavelli preferred the historians who wrote about what happened, more Livy than 
Lucretius. That oft-quoted passage in Machiavelli’s letter to Francesco Vettori  of 10 
December 1513 (142) when he returns home, after a day eking out a living trapping birds 
and gathering firewood in the hills, to bathe and change into a robe to think about politics 
makes the point. Those he gathers around his mind are captains and generals and princes. 
For he says ‘he enters courts of ancient men… and to ask them for the reasons for their 
actions’ (emphasis added) which must mean men of deeds not words. He enters ‘courts’ not 
libraries or studies. We must keep this in mind, especially for those who would seek to 
canonize Machiavelli for his Machiavellism rather than for his insights into the particulars of 
the world in which he struggled with. We should not fear Machiavelli as a theorist of 
international politics, provided we attempt to locate him within the walled contexts in which 
he lived and died.
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